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This case note reflects on the approach that should be adopted by sentencing courts when imposing sentences on child offenders who turn 18 during proceedings. The Western Cape High Court recently considered the application of the sentencing principles in the Child Justice Act and section 28 of the Constitution to child offenders who turn 18 prior to their sentencing. The court confirmed that there is 'no arbitrary end to childhood for children who have committed offences before they attained the age of adulthood' and concluded that the sentencing principles in the Child Justice Act are applicable to children who turn 18 prior to sentencing.
It is established law that child offenders should be afforded special treatment and given sentences that are more lenient than those imposed on adults. 1 The Constitutional Court has embedded child-centred sentencing principles through its judgements by applying section 28 of the Constitution to child offenders. 2 In particular, the Constitutional Court has emphasised the importance of applying section 28(2), which provides that the best interests of the child are paramount in every matter concerning them and section 28(1)(g), which states that children should not be imprisoned except as a measure of last resort.
South Africa is also signatory to international and regional instruments providing for the protection of child offenders' rights. 3 The United Nations 
A brief background
The matter concerned the sentencing of two young men who were 17 when they fatally stabbed a pupil at their school. 9 
Judgement of the High Court
The magistrate's response to the second question was to point out that both the accused turned 18 before they were sentenced. 23 In terms of section 28(3) of the Constitution, a child is a person below the age of 18 years of age. Therefore, the magistrate had concluded that section 28(1)(g) and section
28 (2) were not applicable in this matter. Section 4(1) confirms that the important age to be considered is the age at the time of the offence and the institution of criminal proceedings. 30 This takes into account the fact that offenders who commit crimes when they are children will not always be children when they are in the child justice court for trial and sentencing, due to systemic problems such as delays and challenges related to the laying of charges, the apprehension of the offender and, quite simply, the inertia of the criminal justice system. 31 Such delays and inefficiencies in the system should not prejudice a child and cause them to lose the protection provided by the CJA. 32 Section 4(2)(b) permits prosecution to be initiated in terms of the CJA against an offender who is older than 18 but under the age of 21. However, this only happens in certain circumstances as set out in the national director of public prosecutions directives. 33 These include, inter alia, if the offence is a schedule 1 offence; if the co-accused is a child; if there is doubt about the accused's age; and if the accused appears to be intellectually or developmentally challenged. 34 This provision was included to give the prosecution more flexibility in the exercise of its powers. 35 The provision also envisions the possibility that there could be occasions where an offender has just turned 18, is still attending school, and could benefit from diversion as set out in the act. 36 Lastly, the provision also takes into account that if there is more than one accused in an offence, it would be 'artificial to separate the cases of one or two who are slightly older from those of their contemporaries'.
37
The court in this case found that the two accused qualified to be dealt with in terms of the CJA due to the fact that they were below the age of 18 when they were arrested, and therefore fell under the purview of section 4(1).
38
The High Court goes on to point out that the above sections of the CJA confirm that there is 'no arbitrary end to childhood for children who have committed offences before they attained the age of adulthood, but are still being processed through the criminal justice system when they turn 18'. 39 In this way the CJA promotes the spirit, purport and objects of sections 28(1) and (2) The order given by the High Court
In view of its findings, the court in S v SN made the following order:
51
• The sentences of the accused were set aside, which meant that the magistrate's sentence to direct imprisonment no longer applied to the accused.
• The matter was referred back to the trial court for the urgent consideration of the sentence afresh before a different magistrate.
• The new sentencing magistrate had to take into account the guidance given in the High Court's judgement in respect of the sentencing principles that apply to children.
• The new sentencing magistrate could only sentence the accused after hearing the oral evidence from the probation officers and other relevant witnesses.
• The High Court included the additional safeguard that the matter had to be resubmitted for review by the High Court after the new sentence was imposed.
It is important to note that, in reaching its decision, the High Court was concerned that the magistrate, in his misdirected understanding of section 28, did not consider sentencing the accused to compulsory residence in a child and youth care centre (CYCC) in terms of section 76 of the CJA. 52 The court was of the opinion that this alone necessitated the setting aside of the sentence.
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It is interesting to note that the North Gauteng
High Court had to consider a case in which an offender who had turned 18 was sentenced to a CYCC. This case will be discussed below to highlight the importance of this sentencing option in such circumstances. The magistrate hearing the matter indicated that he wanted to impose a sentence of detention in a child and youth care centre in terms of section 76 of the CJA. 57 However, the centre concerned refused to accept the placement of the child because he was 18 years old.
Approach of the North Gauteng High Court in a similar matter

58
Although the North Gauteng High Court ultimately found that detention was not an appropriate sentence for the accused, it also found that it was important to deal with the question of whether a sentence of compulsory residence in a child and youth care centre could be applied after an offender turned 18. 59 At the outset, Judge Tolmay pointed out that section 4(1) of the CJA needs to be read with section 76, in particular section 76(2), of the CJA, which deals with the sentence of compulsory residence in a child and youth care centre. 60 Section 76(1) and (2) state that:
• A child justice court that convicts a child of an offence may sentence him or her to compulsory residence in a child and youth care centre that provides a programme referred to in section 191
(2) (j) of the Children's Act.
• A sentence referred to in subsection (1) may, subject to subsection (3), be imposed for a period not exceeding five years, or for a period which may not exceed the date on which the child in question turns 21 years of age, whichever date is the earliest.
Section 76(2) allows young offenders who have been sentenced to CYCCs for serious crimes to remain at the centres until they turn 21. This allows for custodial sentences to be imposed without the risk of exposing the young offenders to prison. 61 This promotes the principles that apply to sentencing of young offenders.
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Tolmay held that a proper interpretation of the law must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 63 An interpretation of law that is constitutionally compliant must be selected over one that is not. 64 An interpretation of the CJA must be one that takes into consideration the best interests of a child. 65 Tolmay found that reference to 'child' in section 76(1) (read with section 4(1)), must be read in a manner that includes persons over 18 years or older but under 21 years at the time of sentencing.
66
This interpretation applies only if the person concerned was under 18 at the time of the offence, arrest and issuing of written notice or summons.
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The court invited the Centre for Child Law to make submissions as amicus curiae. 68 The amicus submitted that in terms of the principle of legality everyone has the right to benefit from the least severe prescribed punishment if it changed from the time the offence was committed and the time of sentencing.
69
The CJA requires a less onerous sentencing regime to be applied to children than that of the regime applicable to adult offenders. 70 A child is advised and assisted by his legal representative, based on the sentencing principles in the CJA. 71 The passage of time should not render the child liable to a more onerous sentencing regime than he is given to expect at the start of his case. 72 The CJA was enacted to give effect to the principles that apply to children who come into contact with the criminal justice system, and in particular to recognise the vulnerabilities and special needs of children throughout their interaction with the criminal justice system, including during sentencing. 73 The application of a more onerous sentencing regime after the child turns 18 goes against the objects and purpose of the CJA, 74 as sentencing options under the CJA will no longer be available. This prevents the court from applying sentencing options such as diversion and restorative justice forums that may be more beneficial for the successful rehabilitation of the child offender.
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The amicus submitted that the CJA should be applied in a manner that observes the principle of legality, which directs that a child who turns 18 during the course of proceedings should still be treated as a child until the case is concluded. 76 This takes into account the fact that the best interests of children have been at play since the commencement of the proceedings. 77 Other courts have acknowledged that children who turn 18 during the course of proceedings do not lose the protections granted to them as children. 78 The amicus made reference to the case of S v IO, 79 
